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Introduction
Groundwater is a subject of rising social concern,
especially in coastal zones where most big cities are
located. Due to growing demographic pressure in coastal
areas, groundwater is increasingly mobilized to satisfy
water demands (essentially for agriculture and urban
uses). Overexploitation of coastal aquifers may lead to
permanent water quality degradation as a consequence of
seawater intrusion (Oude Essink 2001a). Policy measures
have been undertaken in some countries either to avoid
this threat or to solve the experienced seawater intrusion
(Scheidleder et al. 1999). Likewise, many other countries
face the overall challenge of changing groundwater poli-
cy to address the emerging problems (Livingston & Gar-
rido 2004).
Groundwater is a complex resource to manage. On one
hand, it is highly complicate to assess economic eff i c i e n-
cy of a policy because few commodities are as pervasive-
ly involved in human economic activities as water is. On
the other hand, groundwater management tends to lag
behind the development of geophysical and geochemical
knowledge, as the aquifers’ characteristics determine
w i t h d r a w a l s ’ impact on the resource state and the way
these impacts spread on the economic system. Additional-
ly, groundwater is a substitute of surface water (open bod-
ies of water such as streams or lakes); then, an integrated
management is almost unavoidable. 
As a consequence, public policy may take a variety of
forms, which will be further called “policy instruments”:
re g u l a t i o n s (to restrict withdrawals), pricing and trading
(to incite to reach economic efficiency), and p u b l i c
i n v e s t m e n t s (to artificially recharge groundwater or to
provide substitutable water resources). These public poli-
cies can be roughly classified into two broad groups
(which can be combined in practice): d e m a n d - s i d e a n d
s u p p l y - s i d e policies. The former refers to every measure
taken to reduce or limit withdrawals, while the later aims
to prevent water resource degradation without restricting
water consumption. 
Some questions arise about the direction that public
interventions will take when coastal aquifers must be
managed: how important will be the public investment in
groundwater policy? Will regulation aim to reduce with-
drawals put forward into policy? What will be the weight
of economic incentives (pricing, penalties, etc.) in these
regulations? 
This article aims at contributing to answer these ques-
tions by analyzing policy instruments taken in diff e r e n t
empirical cases. It first describes the theoretical frame-
work detailing in particular the instruments that can in
theory be implemented. Then, policy instruments mobi-
lized in practice are presented. Finally, we conclude on
the possible evolution of groundwater policy aimed to
prevent and manage seawater intrusion in coastal
aquifers.
Seawater intrusion management: analysis framework
Seawater intrusion occurs when the natural groundwa-
ter flow is inverted due to withdrawals which reduce the
freshwater head of a coastal aquifer having sea connec-
tions (Oude Essink 2001a). These phenomena may be
continuous (in time and space), producing a gradual
degradation of chemical characteristics of freshwater
(Cummings 1971), or discrete (in time) as freshwater
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head declines below some threshold level abruptly ren-
dering the aquifer (or some wells) useless (Tsur & Zemel
1995). In this last case, there may be a lag between the
withdrawal and its impact on freshwater quality. More-
o v e r, seawater intrusion can be reversible or irreversible
as the cost of restoring the aquifer is affordable or pro-
hibitively large (Tsur & Zemel 2004). Continuity and
reversibility features depend on three main characteris-
tics: the relative level of aquifer with respect to sea level,
the total groundwater recharge (essentially precipitations
net from withdrawals), and the aquifer’s size and type
(geological and hydrological characteristics, in particular
the hydraulic conductivity) (Petit 1996). 
From a theoretical point of view, seawater intrusion
occurs because property rights on groundwater (as every
common-pool resources - CPR) are ill-defined. Ground-
water is then overexploited, phenomenon known as the
“tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968). In this situa-
tion, four types of negative externalities prevent market to
allocate the resource efficiently: (i) a stock externality,
when current extractions reduce future withdrawal possi-
bilities (Provencher 1995); (ii) a pump cost externality,
when current withdrawals by reducing the water head
increase the (current and future) pumping cost
(Provencher 1995); (iii) a risk externality, when ground-
water represents an insurance when surface water flow is
stochastic (Provencher & Burt 1993); (iv) a water quality
e x t e r n a l i t y, when the level of groundwater stock has an
impact (which can be negative or positive) on water qual-
ity (Roseta-Palma 2002, Roseta-Palma 2003), as for sea-
water intrusion in coastal aquifers. Whilst stock and pump
cost externalities are also current in the exploitation of
other renewable natural resources (fisheries, forest, and
also biodiversity (Levhari et al. 1981, Levhari & Mirman
1980)), r i s k and water quality externalities are specific to
groundwater exploitation. 
In the neoclassical framework, the presence of exter-
nalities justifies public intervention to efficiently allocate
resources. But, as initially stated by Gisser & Sanchez
(1980), centralized groundwater demand management
may not generate sufficient welfare gains to be worth
enough [this recurrently empirical phenomenon is known
as G i s s e r-Sanchez effect (GSE)]. However, theoretical
and empirical attempts to address GSE robustness [see
(Koundouri 2004a, Koundouri 2004b) for reviews] reveal
that welfare gains of management may vary depending on
hydrologic and economic parameters. Notably, the GSE
is quite sensitive to the slope of demand function
(Nieswiadomy 1985). This suggests that the presence of
d i fferent kind of users enhance the benefits to manage
groundwater demand. And it is the case in coastal areas
where groundwater can be an input of agricultural or
industrial goods, or just a final product that satisfies
potable water needs of cities and individual households.
Each water use can be characterized in terms of water
quantity (and the demand sensitivity), required water
quality, and access time.
The groundwater regulator is charged to balance water
demand and water supply by implementing management
tools prescribed in the legal framework. However, when
it exists, the regulator is not a unique entity: there is a big
institutional and legal complexity around groundwater
management, which can affect the choice of policy instru-
ments, their efficacy and their efficiency (e.g. the A l g e r i-
an Agricultural Ministry subsidies tube wells while the
Environment Ministry forbids them). Then, the interests
of each institution governing groundwater exploitation
have to be accounted for cautiously to understand policy
choices (Dinar 2003). Different groups of users and non
users (like environmentalists) try also to influence the
choice of instruments. Then, policy cost distribution also
matters as it is intimately linked to the political viability
of alternative means to address the seawater intrusion
problem. 
A wide range of policies aimed to cope with environ-
mental externalities has been developed in the economic
literature (Baumol & Oates 1988, Brown 2000). In addi-
tion to these policy instruments, mainly built on rather
simplistic assumptions, other management solutions exist
to fight against seawater intrusion; we classify them in
three groups, provided they act on groundwater supply,
groundwater demand, or simultaneously on groundwater
demand and supply.
Supply policies
Supply policies are implemented to alleviate the
aquifer from anthropic pressures or to directly protect it
from seawater intrusion. 
They consist of different engineering solutions either
to increase or to maintain groundwater availability. Sup-
ply policies can act directly on aquifer: groundwater may
be artificially recharged (sedimentary aquifers), under-
ground channels and water rooms can be built to increase
the aquifer storability (chalk and hard rock aquifers),
even underground concrete or water dams can be
employed. 
Supply policies can also consist of investing in water
substitutes: surface water can be made available by river
dams (and distributed by channel or pipeline networks) or
aqueducts; other water substitutes are found through sea-
water desalinization and waste water reuse. 
These forms of investment find a wide political
approval, especially because they are often initially subsi-
dized (Garrido 1999). However, attention must be paid to
avoid distorted signals for the long run (dynamic efficien-
cy). Prices should be set at a correct level to allow users to
take into account the real cost of water and to economi-
cally and financially justify the development of additional
supplies (Dinar 2003). 
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Demand policies
Several instruments can be mobilized to manage
groundwater withdrawals. We call e c o n o m i c i n s t r u m e n t s
those advocated principally by economists, namely water
pricing, water markets, collective penalties, etc., and
command and contro l instruments those regulations
imposed by governmental agencies like volume quotas,
design standards on the tube wells’ n u m b e r, restrictions
on the drilling depth, etc. Finally, it is sometimes diff i c u l t
to observe the level of groundwater extraction, obliging
to implement incentive contracts that reveal the real
behavior of withdrawers. Let’s now present in more
details some of these demand-side instruments.
Water is priced following a generic function (Montgi-
noul 2006): B = aX + b, with B, the total bill, X the water
consumption level (in m3), a the price per unit of water
used; b the fixed part. The proportional part (a) can be
either constant whatever water consumption level or
priced “per block” (increasing or declining with the con-
sumption level). Water pricing plays two key roles, an eco-
nomic, as it signals water scarcity value and opportunity
cost to guide allocation decisions, and a financial one, as it
represents the main cost recovery mechanism. Moreover,
it is the lonely instrument which can serve to fund infras-
tructure investments (aquifer recharge, etc.). Diff e r e n t
pricing systems can be implemented, depending on the
information available to the regulator and political con-
straints. In practice, water pricing is often set only to cover
supply costs. And it explains the most commonly adopted
structure (a weak “a” and a high “b”) following water cost
structure. However, water pricing suffers some drawbacks
that may reduce its chances to be implemented in practice,
in particular when there is no cost to recover (in this case it
is not a price but a tax). Notably, it requires information on
individual water consumption (knowing all groundwater
users and equip them with water meters). Finally, a price
imposes a financial burden on withdrawers and its impact
on total groundwater withdrawals depends on its capacity
to encourage extraction reductions.
The quota imposes an upper limit to water consump-
tion and can be specified using volumetric, discharge or
time units (eventually combined) (Montginoul 1998). In
general, quotas are accompanied of technology standards
(on the depth and the location of boreholes, on the type of
pumping material, etc.). Usually, certainty on environ-
mental effects of a policy is preferred to a potential eff e c t
that may have a great distributional impact. Then, regula-
tor prefers command and control instruments to manage
groundwater withdrawals rather than economic instru-
ments: the quota directly constraints users instead of indi-
rectly modify their behavior through market signals
(Bohm & Russell 1985).
However economic literature criticizes quota for its
rigidity (Baumol & Oates 1988), even if it can be calcu-
lated to produce the same result than an efficient pricing
and if nothing lets to conclude that a publicly settled pric-
ing could be easier to modify. While quota demands simi-
lar monitoring efforts than a price, its main drawback
comes from the poor incentives it gives to a technological
change (no dynamically efficient). This handicap can be
nevertheless overstepped if individual transferable quotas
(ITQ) are created. These quotas, treated as water rights,
can be exchanged in water markets when the initial allo-
cation does not guarantee efficiency or when some condi-
tions have exogenously changed (new demand, supply
modification, etc.). 
Another instrument, the “ambient tax”, is proposed by
economic literature to solve diffuse pollution problems
and can be adapted to manage groundwater, when indi-
vidual withdrawals can not be observed (Segerson 1988,
Shortle & Horan 2001). Ambient tax is designed from an
observed variable (for example the groundwater level)
which is affected by individual but not observable deci-
sions (here the withdrawals). This tax is billed to all users
(withdrawers) if the observed variable reaches a threshold
which was decided to not overpass. Although an eff i c i e n t
“ambient tax” does not require knowing individual with-
drawals (as for pricing and quotas instruments), it also
requires a high level of information because users’
demand functions have to be known to be able to eff i-
ciently design the ambient tax level. Moreover, its politi-
cal acceptability may be quite limited, provided the
implicit unfairness it breeds; notably, a withdrawer who
exploits efficiently groundwater may be charged due to
the non compliance with the environmental goal of some-
one else.
Supply/demand policies
As advances in geophysical, geochemical and hydro-
geological knowledge allow to better understand the
impact of withdrawals on groundwater resource (and then
to better assessing related externalities), some fine tune
policies become available. For example, it is the case of a
regulation trying to optimally localize tube wells taking
into account coastal aquifer’s characteristics (in particular
by keeping them away from the sea); it is also the case of
a policy aiming to spread withdrawals within the year.
This kind of policies are, evidently, more efficient since
they are based on a system precisely defined enabling to
intervene, at the same time, on different dimensions of the
problem; namely, time and spatial dimensions.
To conclude, the analysis framework advanced to ana-
lyze and compare on a homogenous basis diverse empiri-
cal cases consider several elements: the aquifer, the regu-
l a t o r, the groundwater demands, and the policy instru-
ments. Based on this analysis framework, different sea-
water intrusion management experiences were reviewed
and are presented in the next part (Table I).
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Policy instruments to fight against seawater intrusion
in practice
It is out of the scope of the paper to review all studies
carried out on seawater intrusion management in coastal
aquifers. We restricted the number of empirical cases to
those we have found enough and fair information, and
that match some specific characteristics. More precisely,
we concentrate our bibliographic research on empirical
cases concerning multi-layer sedimentary coastal aquifers
that suffer from seawater intrusion as a consequence of
overexploitation; cases with chalk aquifers are considered
as well. Other dimensions that guided our choice were the
presence of many water uses (agricultural and drinking
water distribution) and a seasonality of withdrawals. 
Even if many cases present a variety of coastal aquifer
types, we roughly classify them into two categories: allu-
vial and chalk aquifers cases (Table II). Some of the cases
enter in both categories (Albania, Italy and Spain, as
many local aquifers were considered in the bibliographic
review), or in any category at all (Algeria because its
reservoirs are constituted of sand). The main common
characteristic between cases is a coastal aquifer’s overex-
ploitation (revealed in particular by a water head decline
and sometimes also by a seawater intrusion). In each cate-
g o r y, seawater intrusion shows different degrees of
r e v e r s i b i l i t y, and can be more or less widespread; it can
take place only during the summer season (Albania,
Croatia, England, Greece) when water demand is at its
higher level and recharge at its lowest, or it can stay struc-
turally (California, Spain, Algeria, France, some basins of
I t a l y, Turkey). The consequences of seawater intrusion
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Table I. – Literature material mobilized for the presentation of the different cases. 
are positively related to the degree of reversibility: in the
chalk category seawater intrusion obliges, sometimes, to
retire polluted boreholes from exploitation for a while,
but they are again operational after a rain season (the
chalk of England South Downs or in Croatia); in some
cases from the alluvial category, seawater intrusion has
only a diffuse but long-lasting impact, leading to a lower
groundwater quality, which can be still (at least partially)
exploited (California, France, Spain). 
Users’ characteristics are also various but in all studied
cases two types are systematically present and responsi-
ble for the main part of withdrawals: the agriculture and
the urban water. Other users are also met: the tourism (in
France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey), the industry (in A l b a n y,
Algeria, California, and Spain) and individual households
– through private tube wells (like in the south of France).
In all cases, withdrawals are mostly concentrated in sum-
mer.
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Table I. – (Continued)
Agriculture was historically the biggest groundwater
w i t h d r a w e r. The urbanization of coastal areas limited
afterwards the abundance of groundwater resources (like
in California and the south of France). Other changes are
also met: a coastal mass tourism (in Mediterranean coun-
tries), the installation of industries closed to urban areas
(in Algeria), a change in irrigation practices (to abandon
surface water for groundwater, like in Albania and some
basins in the south of France).
The juridical groundwater status is various. Even if in
some cases this status is not clearly defined (Albania,
Algeria, Greece), three property regimes can be distin-
guished: common property (France, Turkey), private
good (California, with a distinction between senior and
junior rights), and local or national State property (Croat-
ia, England, Italy, and Spain). In most of the studied
cases, groundwater can be considered as a private good
linked with land property. However, as groundwater is
not systematically registered, users and withdrawals
(other than urban water) are not known, excepting a few
cases like the Orange case in California or the South of
England.
The regulator capacity to deal with seawater intrusion
is also highly various. Sometimes the legal framework
d o e s n ’t exist or it is not adapted to solve the current man-
agement problems (Algeria, Greece, and Turkey). In
other cases, governmental institutions have no clear
responsibilities; they may also have opposite goals, or
even have no funds to implement what they decide. It is
for example the case in Albania where there is an innova-
tive legislative framework but not enough financial
resources to implement it.
Table II summarizes policy instruments that have been
implemented. The key actions taken are on the supply side.
The main action is the development of substitute resources:
construction of rivers’ dams (Algeria, California, Greece,
Roussillon aquifer in South of France and Turkey), rainwa-
ter retention structures (California, Croatia and Spain), or
aqueducts (California, Croatia, England and Italy) were the
first actions performed. Non conventional substitutes like
desalinization plants (Algeria, Greece, Italy and Spain) or
waste water reuse (California, England, Greece, Italy,
Spain and foreseen in Algeria) complement nowadays the
choice of substitutable resources. 
Direct actions to preserve coastal aquifers from seawa-
ter intrusion are also taken: artificial aquifer recharg e
(California, Croatia, Italy, and Turkey), construction of
u n d e rground dams to stop seawater progression (Califor-
nia, Turkey) or of underground channels to increase stor-
age capacity (Croatia, England). In the reviewed cases,
studies on aquifer situation and its functioning are done
only when these direct actions are foreseen.
The cases with an intensive use of supply policies
[California, Croatia, England, Italy and Spain (Balearic
Islands)] are those where there is an overall water
resource deficit, or a spatial disparity on its availability.
H o w e v e r, even if water has a high economic value, this is
not sufficient to trigger heavy infrastructure investments:
to invest, a concrete and current threat on the resource
(which limits the local economic development) must
o c c u r. For instance, in the Orange County coastal plain
(California) case, investments were done because the sea-
water intrusion progress threatened the regional econom-
ic sustainability (8% of the California State population)
and because groundwater protection investments were the
only way to ensure it: groundwater provides 75% of the
global demand in this Orange plain; the rest is conveyed
from other basins at a high cost, and taken from the Santa
Ana River (that runs through the basin) which capacity is
exhausted. 
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Table II. – Implemented policy instruments and aquifer type.
On the demand side management policies, permits are
the most popular instrument. But anyone of the reviewed
cases has developed a permit market. In general, permits
precise the pre-required conditions of water extraction:
they can specify the annual extraction, the instantaneous
maximal flow, the water use and the water destination, the
b o r e h o l e ’s deepness and the pumping material’s charac-
teristics. Volume and flow meters can be also imposed
(Spain, California, England, and France). When annual
extraction is specified, the issued permit is more than an
authorization to drill and pump but also a quota (Spain,
England and Turkey). However, while permits allow
knowing new extraction points and their characteristics,
they won’t remediate the ignorance on currently active
but old boreholes; a probably costly census of users is
needed (Albania, Algeria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, south of
France). 
Water pricing, to fight against seawater intrusion, is
not the main demand-side instrument used due to its high
informational conditions. Whilst these conditions are
met for urban water and volumetric pricing is commonly
implemented in most of the reviewed cases (California,
Croatia, England, Italy, Spain), they are not met for the
agricultural use. In this situation, the collective surface
irrigation water price can have adverse effects: many
users facing a surface water price increase (due to a
reduction of subsidies on operational and capital cost of
the irrigation channels) have shifted to individual
groundwater irrigation as no charge exists on this
resource (Albania and the Roussillon plain in South of
France). However, some groundwater pricing policies
are observed. Sometimes, they are applied to cover
induced costs (like the aquifer recharge – for instance in
Orange in California) and sometimes independently
(California, England and France with Water A g e n c i e s ’
fees). 
There are also other demand-side regulations that prin-
cipally consist of: public education and awareness on
water savings’ practices (California, Greece, Balearic
Islands, and Turkey), water wastes (Balearic Islands), and
rationing (Algeria, Spain). And some fine tune policies
are implemented in England (seasonally modify the loca-
tion of withdrawals) and in Croatia (smoothing of with-
drawals during the day). These both cases are character-
ized by chalk aquifers with a salinity concentration highly
reactive to the groundwater flow variations.
F i n a l l y, in some cases, no policies are implemented to
cope with seawater intrusion in particular, or with
groundwater management in general. In Algeria, there is
no clear legal framework, interpretation problems arise
and responsibilities of the different regulators are not
correctly defined: in this country, water management
can be considered as a crisis management. In Albania, a
modern legal framework exists, but it encounters many
starting problems related to cultural and financial
aspects. 
Conclusion
This paper reviews policy instruments implemented in
some empirical cases to fight against seawater intrusion
in coastal aquifers. These instruments are classified into
two broad groups (which may be combined): d e m a n d -
side and supply-side policies.
The ignorance on demand characteristics is the main
d i fficulty encountered to apply demand-side manage-
ment. And the success of such policies critically depends
on the means that the regulator disposes to design and to
enforce them. For instance, the Balearic Islands (Spain)
have already implemented demand-side instruments
(pricing, quotas, permits and water saving education), but
their persistent water deficit prevents them to expect an
improvement of their already polluted aquifers.
That explains why demand policies are often imple-
mented after supply management solutions: supply poli-
cies have sufficed to prevent seawater intrusion (Italy and
France) or to limit its consequences (Croatia) until their
realization becomes unfeasible (because no solution
exists or supply actions are too expensive). 
The most successful groundwater management experi-
ences, California and England cases, are associated to a
supply and demand side policies combination. While sup-
ply side policies allow to protect or increase available
groundwater resources, demand side policies enables to
fund them (pricing) and to dispose of accurate informa-
tion about all relevant demand characteristics (volume,
location, season, etc.). Consequently, the available infor-
mation and the financial health of the management sys-
tem results in a greater flexibility to adapt management to
d i fferent scenarios. This flexibility is particularly pre-
cious once supply policies are no longer available, when
resource reallocation is the only management option.
H o w e v e r, a necessary condition to flexibility is a larg e l y
powerful regulator capable of correctly enforce policies
(i.e. in the Orange County Water District, inspectors have
the right to enter in private property to search boreholes).
This review shows also that groundwater pricing is not
widely applied. And demand-side policies are successful-
ly applied when groundwater management institutions
are mature because they were early confronted to the sea-
water intrusion problem (also as the problem becomes a
social concern withdrawers are less hostile to demand-
side policies). The definition of the groundwater juridical
status usually precedes demand-side policies, which are
combined to supply actions. Then, sometimes they are
aimed to assure the effectiveness (i.e. permits, quotas,
seasonal restrictions, etc.) and/or durability (i.e. pricing to
fund artificial recharge) of supply actions. But, they are
not aimed to introduce economic incentives for reducing
exploitation.
In conclusion, the most successful experiences are
those whose investments were directly funded through
groundwater pricing. In those cases, a virtuous circle in
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groundwater management (to fight against seawater
intrusion) is generated. As correct pricing of the already
developed resources allows the integration of supply aug-
mentation with efficient demand management, it ensures
the economic and financial justification for the develop-
ment of additional supplies. However, even if in this
paper cases have been roughly classified in successful
and failed experiences, a more general analysis should
consider them dynamically, as going through the different
stages of a structural reform process.
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